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"Character" is invoked by the bourgeois media with inquisitorial 
reverence in US Presidential election campaigns as a means 
of problematising candidates. Distinctions are avidly drawn 
between "personality"-the psychological cards one is 
dealt-and "character"-how one plays them. A failing that derives from "personality" (which 
seems to be about fun and the id) can be overcome by "character" (which seems to be about 
repression and the ego/superego). In the 2000 elections, for example, George Bush Minor's 
character was valorized as distinct from the Republican norm, because of his putative 
compassion and bipartisan tendencies. He was not evaluated on the measurable materiality of 
his public service-spectacular educational underachievement and record rates of execution 
while Governor of Texas-or his recreational drug record, nepotistic affirmative-action entry to 
the Ivy League, and sordid business history. Conversely, Al Gore Minor's character was 
scrutinized in 2000 because of his fundraising activities on behalf of Democrats and putative 
tall tales about inventing the Internet, inspiring Love Story, and investigating the Love Canal. 
He was not evaluated on the measurable materiality of his public service-spectacular 
economic growth and record educational attainment under his Vice-Presidency. As of early 
May 2008, we have seen this media obsession with character played out over John McCain 
being a prisoner of war; Hillary Clinton collecting bouquets versus dodging bullets; and Barack 
Obama listening to a righteous critic of US imperialism. These activities are meant to tell us 
something about each person's capacity to implement sound public policy, along with whether 
or not they wear flag pins on their lapels. 
Apart from the fact that the press is to the right of US public opinion1 and is extremely 
nationalistic, what might explain such silliness? I suspect that the palaver about character is a 
grand metaphor for managing the differences and difficulties of language, history, race, 
gender, and class that color the nation's radical post-1970s project of redistributing wealth 
upwards. 
The first great wave of immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century left the US 87 percent 
white/Euro-American, a proportion that remained static through the 1950s. But by 2007, the 
minority population included 44 million Latin@s, 40 million African Americans, 15 million 
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Asians, 4.5 million Native Americans, and a million Pacific Islanders. The foreign-born
segment is double the proportion from 1970, half as many again as 1995, and back to
Depression-era levels. Almost half the people living in Los Angeles and Miami were born
beyond the border, and there was a net national increase of two and a half million arrivals
without immigration documents between 2002 and 2006. Not surprisingly, private and public
hybridity is increasingly the norm. Whereas in 1990, one in twenty-three US marriages crossed
race and ethnicity, by 2005 the figure was one in fifteen, an increase of 65 percent. As for the
labor force, in 1960 one in seventeen workers was born outside the United States, the majority
from Europe. Today, the proportion is one in six, mostly from Latin America and Asia.2
At the same time as they confront these profound cultural changes, economic life for many US
residents, both long-term and recent, is getting worse and worse. By contrast with European
welfare systems, the capacity to exit poverty has diminished over three decades of
neoliberalism and suburbanization, thanks to a gigantic clumping of wealth at the apex of the
nation, atop a poor, unskilled, and unhealthy base. Forty-six million US residents are indigent
(even the Bush Administration admits to 13.3 percent of the population living in poverty, the
greatest proportion in the Global North); 52 million are functionally analphabetic; and 46 million
lack health insurance, with an additional 36 million going without it at some point in the two
years to 2003. One in six adults who has insurance experiences severe difficulties meeting
medical expenses. Access to money and net worth are massively stratified by class, race, and
gender. In 2003, black men earned 73 percent of the hourly wage rate for white people, and
migrants are disproportionately represented amongst the poor, with wages averaging 75 cents
for every dollar paid to Yanquis. Twenty years ago, neoclassical economists hailed the impact
of market precepts over social democracy, because just 20 percent of the public's future
income was predictable based on paternal income. By the 1990s, and two more decades of
deregulation, that figure had doubled. Some suggest it now stands at 60 percent. In the first
six years of his rule, Bush Minor presided over a 9 percent increase in the poverty rate, a 12
percent increase in people without heath insurance, and immobile family income. Minor
himself has been forced to proclaim that “income inequality is real—it's been rising for more
than 25 years.” In the two decades from 1979, the highest-paid 1 percent of the population
doubled its share of national pre-tax income, to 18 percent. Incomes of the top 1 percent
increased by 194 percent; the top 20 percent by 70 percent—and the bottom 20 percent by
just 6.4 percent. In 1967, chief executive officers of corporations were paid 24 times the
average wage of employees. Thirty years later, they received 300 times that amount. The
Congressional Budget Office reports that across the late 1990s, the wealthiest 1 percent of US
households had a greater combined income than the poorest 40 percent. In California, where I
live, the economy is larger than that of all but a few sovereign-states around the world. So
what? Working-class family income in the state has increased by just 4 percent since 1969,
while its ruling-class equivalent has grown by 41 percent. Nationally, corporate profits are at
their highest level in five decades, while wages and salaries have the lowest share of the
national pie on record. Over Bush Minor's first term, profits rose by 60 percent, but wages by
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just 10 percent. In 2004, after-tax profits for corporations grew to their highest proportion of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since the Depression. In the eyes of Fortune magazine,
corporations “deserve credit for their restraint,” because “[i]nstead of hiring recklessly, they
found ways to produce a trim workforce.” The investment bank UBS avows that this is a
“golden era of profitability.” The Fortune 500 group of companies received US$785 billion of
income in 2006, up 29 percent on 2005, and the biggest profits in the history of the index
(Tully, 2007). Half the money made goes to a tenth of the population, even as tax burdens
have shifted dramatically onto workers. In the three years from 2003, hourly wages (adjusted
for inflation) declined, despite productivity increasing. Between 1999 and 2004, the bottom 90
percent of US households saw their income rise by 2 percent; for those “earning” over US$1
million annually, income grew by more than 87 percent. In 2005, real wages fell for all but the
top 5 percent, while productivity rose by 3 percent and GDP by 3.2 percent. The Gini index
saw inequality attain the same level as the Great Depression. Whereas there were 290,000
individual bankruptcies in 1980, 2005 saw more than two million. Over a similar period,
mortgage foreclosures increased five times, and the personal savings rate became negative
for the first time since the pit of the Depression.3
Put another way, the gap between what labor produces and what it reaps is greater than at
any point in recorded history. This bizarre re-concentration of wealth in the hands of the
bourgeoisie is unprecedented since the advent of working-class electoral franchises. No
wonder Britain's Economist captioned a photo of the Queen of England greeting Bush Minor
and his wife Laura, as “Liz, meet the royals.” We are back in what Mark Twain and Charles
Dudley Warner bitingly satirized as The Gilded Age, the nineteenth-century heyday of capital
when Andrew Carnegie coined the term “The Gospel of Wealth” to legitimize his race, class,
and gender privilege.4 No wonder Warren Buffet avowed in a 2003 letter to Berkshire
investors that “[i]f class warfare is being waged in America, my class is clearly winning.”5 Even
some unrepentant fans of capitalism complain that “[m]any Americans are one lost job and
one medical emergency away from bankruptcy,” while James Glassman, one of the
reactionary American Enterprise Institute's pop thinkers, acknowledges that “[w]e've
redistributed income about as much as we can.” Almost half the population does not see hard
work as the means to a better life, because employment is less secure, and fluctuation in
household income more intense, than people were brought up to remember. In sum, if we
juxtapose aggregate prosperity against personal insecurity, the economy is doing well by
ruling-class indices, but poorly by working-class ones, in terms of both inequality and
instability.6
Each major political party rejects serious policy changes that would address these social
transformations. Putative fans of laissez-faire obsess over slashing social services, but abjure
a truly open labor market that would welcome workers of the world. Putative champio ns of the
poor obsess over the mythic middle class and do nothing to restrain either corporate welfare or
wealth redistribution upwards. In place of such real policy questions, the focus of campaigners
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and pundits alike is on trivial shibboleths such as “hope,” “change,” and “experience.” We are
forced to endure homilies without end: of children, church, and hearth. “Character” continues
to be a displaced and displacing shifter in the semantic mess of US politics. In place of such
clich s, we need a politics that addresses the profound cultural and economic transformations
of our era. Character be damned.
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